{"id":1467,"date":"2026-11-16T07:16:06","date_gmt":"2026-11-16T07:16:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/clt.nliu.ac.in\/?p=1467"},"modified":"2026-11-16T07:24:29","modified_gmt":"2026-11-16T07:24:29","slug":"from-knowledge-to-anticipation-indias-emerging-departure-from-global-intermediary-liability-norms","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/clt.nliu.ac.in\/?p=1467","title":{"rendered":"From Knowledge to Anticipation: India&#8217;s Emerging Departure from Global Intermediary Liability Norms"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Nandini Sharma is lawyer in New Delhi.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">How can platforms be expected to prevent unlawful content before they have identified it as unlawful? The law governing online intermediaries has historically been shaped by a common concern that platforms should not be forced to police all user-generated content in advance. Across democratic jurisdictions, lawmakers and courts recognised that broad monitoring obligations would encourage over-censorship, chill lawful speech and burden innovation. Consequently, intermediary liability frameworks in the United States, the European Unio and India developed around a reactive model in which liability generally depended on knowledge of unlawful content and a subsequent failure to act.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Today, however, India appears to be moving in a different direction. Through amendments to the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.meity.gov.in\/static\/uploads\/2026\/03\/0b576f2071694b52e4cd6bb1b6dfab1e.pdf\">Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021<\/a> (\u201cRules\u201d), India is increasingly imposing obligations that require intermediaries not merely to respond to illegality after notice, but to anticipate and prevent it before any notice is received.&nbsp; The <a href=\"https:\/\/www.meity.gov.in\/static\/uploads\/2025\/10\/708f6a344c74249c2e1bbb6890342f80.pdf\">2025 amendment<\/a> to Rule 3(1)(d) retains and formalises an actual-knowledge-based takedown mechanism. In contrast, the \u201creasonable efforts\u201d requirement of &nbsp;Rule 3(1)(b), followed more explicitly by the February 2026 amendments concerning synthetically generated information, reflects an expanding role of preventive obligations alongside it. Among major democratic jurisdictions, this marks a notable departure from the approach adopted in both the United States and the European Union.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Knowledge Framework of Foreign Jurisdictions<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The United States adopted this approach through <a href=\"https:\/\/www.columbia.edu\/~mr2651\/ecommerce3\/2nd\/statutes\/CommunicationsDecencyAct.pdf\">Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act<\/a>. Its enactment was largely a response to <em>Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.,<\/em><a href=\"#_edn1\" id=\"_ednref1\">[i]<\/a> where a court held that Prodigy could be treated as a publisher because it actively moderated user content. This left a perverse incentive where platforms that attempted to remove harmful content in good faith faced greater liability than those that did nothing. Section 230 overturned this by ensuring that platforms would not be treated as publishers of third-party content and would not lose protection for engaging in good-faith moderation. The result was a framework that encouraged moderation without imposing a general duty to monitor user activity.<a href=\"#_edn2\" id=\"_ednref2\">[ii]<\/a> &nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The European Union adopted a similar knowledge-based model. <a href=\"https:\/\/digitalfairnessact.com\/digital-services-act-dsa\">The Digital Services Act (DSA)<\/a>, which replaced the liability framework contained in the e-Commerce Directive, preserves safe-harbour protection unless a platform obtains actual knowledge of illegal content and fails to act expeditiously. It also includes a Good Samaritan clause protecting voluntary moderation efforts and crucially, prohibits member states from imposing general monitoring obligations. Although the DSA introduces extensive transparency and accountability requirements, it deliberately stops short of requiring broad ex-ante filtering of <a href=\"https:\/\/www.jipitec.eu\/jipitec\/article\/view\/317\">user content.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">India was not always an exception to this approach. Until November 2025, the proviso to <a href=\"https:\/\/www.meity.gov.in\/static\/uploads\/2026\/03\/0b576f2071694b52e4cd6bb1b6dfab1e.pdf\">Rule 3(1)(d)<\/a> protected intermediaries from losing safe harbour merely because they voluntarily removed unlawful content or acted on user grievances. Its omission by the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.meity.gov.in\/static\/uploads\/2025\/10\/90dedea70a3fdfe6d58efb55b95b4109.pdf\">2025 Amendment Rules<\/a> therefore marked a further departure from the good-faith moderation protections retained in the US and EU frameworks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>India\u2019s Evolving Anticipatory Safe Harbour Model<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">India&#8217;s intermediary liability regime initially shared many such concerns. Following controversies such as <a href=\"https:\/\/delhihighcourt.nic.in\/app\/case_number_pdf\/2004:DHC:1905\/VJS21122004BA22842004_165609.pdf\"><em>Avnish Bajaj v. State (NCT of Delhi),<\/em><\/a> the Parliament enhanced intermediary safe-harbour safeguards with the 2008 amendment to <a href=\"https:\/\/www.indiacode.nic.in\/bitstream\/123456789\/13116\/1\/it_act_2000_updated.pdf\">Section 79 of the Information Technology Act of 2000.<\/a> The constitutional basis for this was later clarified in <a href=\"https:\/\/indiankanoon.org\/doc\/110813550\/\"><em>Shreya Singhal v. Union of India.<\/em><\/a> While striking down Section 66A of the IT Act, the Supreme Court held that intermediaries could not reasonably be expected to determine the legality of content on their own. Accordingly, &#8220;actual knowledge&#8221; under Section 79(3)(b) occurs only when a valid court order or a government notification directs takedown. The Court observed that requiring intermediaries to act on private complaints alone will trigger excessive censorship and have chilling effects on free speech. In <a href=\"https:\/\/indiankanoon.org\/doc\/12972852\/\"><em>MySpace Inc. v. Super Cassettes Industries Ltd.<\/em><\/a>, the Delhi High Court reinforced this approach by rejecting &nbsp;the notion that intermediaries must proactively monitor millions of uploads for copyright infringement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.meity.gov.in\/static\/uploads\/2026\/02\/550681ab908f8afb135b0ad42816a1c9.pdf\">Rule 3(1)(b) of the Rules<\/a> does not expressly require intermediaries to monitor all user-generated content. Its practical operation differs little from a monitoring obligation. The Rule requires intermediaries to make &#8220;reasonable efforts&#8221; to prevent users from sharing content falling within a broad range of prohibited categories. Unlike the knowledge-based framework recognised in <a href=\"https:\/\/indiankanoon.org\/doc\/110813550\/\"><em>Shreya Singhal<\/em><\/a>, compliance turns on preventive measures before any legal determination of illegality iexps made.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Judicial engagement with what \u201creasonable effort\u201d entails remains internally inconsistent. The Delhi High Court in <a href=\"https:\/\/indiankanoon.org\/doc\/105980506\/\"><em>Mrs X v. Union of India<\/em>,<\/a> recognised that the 2022 amendment increased intermediary obligations by requiring \u201creasonable efforts\u201d to ensure that users do not host or share prohibited content, rather than merely requiring intermediaries to inform users of such restrictions. In <a href=\"https:\/\/indiankanoon.org\/doc\/172701335\/\"><em>Kunal Kamra v. Union of India<\/em>,<\/a> the Bombay High Court struck down the government\u2019s Fact-Checking Unit under <a href=\"https:\/\/www.meity.gov.in\/static\/uploads\/2026\/03\/0b576f2071694b52e4cd6bb1b6dfab1e.pdf\">Rule 3(1)(b)(v)<\/a> as unconstitutionally vague, while the wider \u201creasonable efforts\u201d requirement under Rule 3(1)(b) remains unaffected. In her dissenting opinion, Justice Gokhale observed that an intermediary may become aware of offending information \u201csuo motu or upon a complaint\u201d and is expected to make \u201creasonable efforts\u201d in relation to such information.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Delhi High Court\u2019s decision in <a><\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/www.livelaw.in\/pdf_upload\/vib02062025fac62024115220-603051.pdf\"><em>Indiamart Intermesh Ltd. v. P<\/em><em>uma Se<\/em><\/a>adopted a more restrained approach. While requiring preventive safeguards such as seller undertakings, the Division Bench retained notice-based removal for specific infringing listings. Its reliance on <a href=\"https:\/\/indiankanoon.org\/doc\/12972852\/\">MySpace<\/a>\u2019s actual-knowledge framework, without engaging <em>Mrs X<\/em>\u2019s recognition of the heightened 2022 obligation, leaves the scope of \u201creasonable efforts\u201d uncertain. That unresolved conflict without a clear judicial standard itself may act as an anticipatory sounding rule to be read defensively by the intermediaries and may encourage over-removal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Rules also impose complaint-handling duties, grievance officers, twenty-four-hour acknowledgment, and compressed removal windows for specific harm categories, pressuring platforms toward automated, pre-emptive screening rather than case-by-case review on notice. This is reinforced by the Sahyog portal, developed by the Ministry of Home Affairs, which allows government departments and police officers to route takedown notices to intermediaries under <a href=\"https:\/\/www.indiacode.nic.in\/bitstream\/123456789\/13116\/1\/it_act_2000_updated.pdf\">Section 79(3)(b)<\/a> read with Rule 3(1)(d). In <a href=\"https:\/\/indiankanoon.org\/doc\/7614885\/\"><em>X Corp v. Union of India<\/em><\/a> the portal was challenged before the Karnataka High Court as a parallel, unaccountable blocking mechanism. The petition was dismissed by a single bench, which held the portal to be a valid administrative tools describing Sahyog as \u2018an instrument of public good.\u2019 The decision has since been appealed. The portal, therefore forms part of the shift towards anticipatory enforcement, representing the increasingly institutionalised notice-based limb of India\u2019s intermediary liability framework alongside its expanding preventive obligations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Analysis of the Indian Intermediary Liability Norms Model<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">India has not formally imposed a general monitoring obligation and no court has yet characterised <a href=\"https:\/\/www.meity.gov.in\/static\/uploads\/2026\/03\/0b576f2071694b52e4cd6bb1b6dfab1e.pdf\">Rule 3(1)(b)<\/a> in those terms. Yet the combination of proactive prevention duties, compressed takedown timelines, institutionalised notice channels and continuing judicial uncertainty creates incentives for intermediaries to act pre-emptively rather than await specific notice, increasingly producing monitoring-like compliance in practice. The emerging framework is not a complete abandonment of knowledge based safe harbour, but development of a hybrid one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The shift is not uniformly unjustified. For narrowly drawn categories of non-consensual intimate imagery and morphed images under Rule 3(2)(b), a compressed, complaint-triggered window arguably reflects a defensible judgment. Rule 3(3)(a)(i) of <a href=\"https:\/\/www.meity.gov.in\/static\/uploads\/2026\/03\/0b576f2071694b52e4cd6bb1b6dfab1e.pdf\">the 2026 amendment<\/a> similarly confines anticipatory obligations to defined harms requiring intermediaries facilitating synthetically generated content to deploy \u201creasonable and appropriate technical measures,\u201d including automated tools, to prevent specified unlawful synthetic content.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">However, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.meity.gov.in\/static\/uploads\/2026\/03\/0b576f2071694b52e4cd6bb1b6dfab1e.pdf\">Rule 3(1)(b)&#8217;s general &#8220;reasonable efforts&#8221;<\/a> duty is harder to defend on the same ground as it is open-textured, untethered to any defined harm category and leaves intermediaries to define the standard themselves in the absence of judicial guidance. A more coherent approach would therefore retain narrowly tailored preventive duties for clearly defined harms, while clarifying Rule 3(1)(b) does not impose an open-ended obligation to identify illegality in advance. For other content, liability should remain tied to legally cognisable knowledge and failure to act thereafter. Uncertainty may therefore push intermediaries to remove lawful content to avoid liability risking a concern that underlies <em>Stratton Oakmont<\/em><a href=\"#_edn3\" id=\"_ednref3\"><em><strong>[iii]<\/strong><\/em><\/a><em>,<\/em> &nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/digitalfairnessact.com\/digital-services-act-dsa\">the DSA&#8217;s<\/a> bar on general monitoring, and <a href=\"https:\/\/indiankanoon.org\/doc\/110813550\/\"><em>Shreya Singhal<\/em><\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">India&#8217;s evolving intermediary liability framework reflects legitimate concerns about rapidly proliferating online harms. Certain categories, particularly child sexual abuse material and non-consensual intimate imagery, may justify narrowly tailored preventive obligations. However, such exceptions, shall not obscure the broader principle that intermediary liability ought to remain grounded in knowledge rather than anticipation. The difficulty with <a href=\"https:\/\/www.meity.gov.in\/static\/uploads\/2026\/03\/0b576f2071694b52e4cd6bb1b6dfab1e.pdf\">Rule 3(1)(b)<\/a> lies not merely in its preventive character but in its open-textured formulation. Faced with such uncertainty, intermediaries are likely to err on the side of removing lawful speech rather than risking liability.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The comparative experience of the United States and the European Union demonstrates that safe harbours have historically rested on a common premise that platforms should not bear responsibility for monitoring lawful expression in advance. Liability arises only after an intermediary acquires legally cognisable knowledge of unlawful content and fails to act. <a href=\"https:\/\/indiankanoon.org\/doc\/110813550\/\"><em>Shreya Singhal<\/em><\/a> reflects the same concern by refusing to require intermediaries to become private adjudicators of legality. A knowledge-based safe-harbour regime therefore protects freedom of expression while preserving the proper institutional boundaries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ednref1\" id=\"_edn1\">[i]<\/a> <em>Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co.,<\/em> No<em>.<\/em> 31063\/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ednref2\" id=\"_edn2\">[ii]<\/a> Jeff Kosseff, <em>What Was the Purpose of Section 230? That\u2019s a Tough Question,<\/em> (103 B.U. L. Rev., 2023)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"#_ednref3\" id=\"_edn3\">[iii]<\/a> Supra note (i)<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Nandini Sharma is lawyer in New Delhi. Introduction How can platforms be expected to prevent unlawful content before they have identified it [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1467","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-blog-series","col-md-6 col-sm-6"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/clt.nliu.ac.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1467","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/clt.nliu.ac.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/clt.nliu.ac.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/clt.nliu.ac.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/clt.nliu.ac.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=1467"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/clt.nliu.ac.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1467\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1470,"href":"https:\/\/clt.nliu.ac.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1467\/revisions\/1470"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/clt.nliu.ac.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=1467"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/clt.nliu.ac.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=1467"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/clt.nliu.ac.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=1467"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}