{"id":1471,"date":"2026-11-16T07:24:17","date_gmt":"2026-11-16T07:24:17","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/clt.nliu.ac.in\/?p=1471"},"modified":"2026-11-16T07:24:18","modified_gmt":"2026-11-16T07:24:18","slug":"internet-of-things-iot-devices-as-digital-witnesses-privacy-and-evidentiary-challenges-in-india","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/clt.nliu.ac.in\/?p=1471","title":{"rendered":"Internet of Things (IoT) Devices as Digital Witnesses: Privacy and Evidentiary Challenges in India"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Sangjam Chakraborty and Kanishk Garg are Second Year Students at National Law University Odisha &amp; Hidayatullah National Law University<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h1 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Introduction<\/strong><\/h1>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In October 2025, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/articles\/2025-10-06\/apple-faces-probe-in-france-over-voice-recordings-made-by-siri\">French prosecutors opened a formal investigation into Apple&#8217;s Siri<\/a> after a rights group alleged that the voice assistant had been recording fragments of private conversations without users&#8217; informed consent for years. The story made headlines across Europe, and for an Indian reader its relevance lies less in any direct legal connection than in its timing: barely five weeks later, the Indian government notified the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.meity.gov.in\/static\/uploads\/2025\/11\/53450e6e5dc0bfa85ebd78686cadad39.pdf\">Digital Personal Data Protection Rules, 2025<\/a>, bringing into operation a law that had been enacted two years earlier. Just as one jurisdiction was asking whether an always-listening speaker could ever lawfully consent to what it overhears, India was finalising the rulebook meant to answer a closely related question at home. Smart speakers, fitness trackers, connected doorbells, and similar devices are no longer considered to be something astonishing in ordinary Indian homes, since many Indian users can already be seen using voice assistants. This study aims to investigate the adequacy of the legal and evidentiary framework in ascertaining whether the data collected by such devices may be accepted as a credible \u201cwitness\u201d, including a review of admissibility in accordance with Section 63 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 in conjunction with constitutional privacy jurisprudence in the wake of Justice K.S. Puttaswamy\u2019s judgment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h1 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>IoT Devices as Emerging Evidence<\/strong><\/h1>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The idea of a device as an eyewitness is not hypothetical. In one of the earliest and most cited instances, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/technology-38450658\">American investigators in Arkansas sought recordings from an Amazon Echo placed near a hot tub where a man had been found dead,<\/a> treating the device&#8217;s always-on microphone as a potential source of ambient audio from around the time of death. Since then, courts in the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.fox5ny.com\/news\/fitbit-is-key-evidence-in-connecticut-murder-case\">United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia have increasingly considered data from devices such as Fitbits, Garmin watches, and Apple Watches when assessing the credibility of an accused\u2019s alibi<\/a>, using step counts, heart rate spikes and GPS trails to fix the precise minute at which a victim stopped moving. India has not yet produced a reported judgment built around such data, but the underlying technology is already present in Indian homes and on Indian wrists in large numbers. Therefore, it is only a matter of time before such data is presented as evidence before an Indian court.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h1 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Admissibility Under Indian Evidence Law<\/strong><\/h1>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Under Indian law, sound, sensor or location data generated by an IoT device qualifies as an electronic record under the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.indiacode.nic.in\/bitstream\/123456789\/13116\/1\/it_act_2000_updated.pdf\">Information Technology Act, 2000<\/a>, and consequently as documentary evidence, admissible only through the special procedure codified in <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mha.gov.in\/sites\/default\/files\/2024-04\/250882_english_01042024_0.pdf\">Section 63 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023<\/a>. The provision came into force on 1 July 2024, replacing Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which had generated nearly two decades of conflicting interpretation, from <a href=\"https:\/\/jajharkhand.in\/wp\/wp-content\/judicial_updates_files\/13_Evidence_Act\/22_section_10\/State_(N.C.T._Of_Delhi)_vs_Navjot_Sandhu@_Afsan_Guru_on_4_August,_2005.PDF\">State (NCT of Delhi) v Navjot Sandhu<\/a>&#8216;s tolerance of secondary evidence without a certificate, through <a href=\"https:\/\/aphc.gov.in\/docs\/imp_judgements\/Anvar%20PV%20case.pdf\">Anvar P.V. v P.K. Basheer<\/a>&#8216;s strict-compliance rule, to <a href=\"https:\/\/aphc.gov.in\/docs\/imp_judgements\/Arjun%20Panditrao%20Khotkar%20_%20Kailash%20Kushanrao%20Gorantyal%20And%20Ors._1701334263.pdf\">Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal<\/a>&#8216;s settled rule that the certificate is mandatory but may be compelled from an uncooperative custodian. Section 63 carries that rule forward largely intact, with two changes that matter for IoT evidence specifically. It now explicitly covers output from any communication device, not just a computer, closing an old ambiguity over whether smartphones and smart speakers were covered at all. And it replaces Section 65B&#8217;s single signatory with a two-part Schedule certificate, one part from the person in charge of the device and the other from an independent expert, both required to record the record&#8217;s hash value and algorithm. Because most reported litigation still concerns pre-transition offences, courts still resolve certificate disputes under the old Section 65B, as the Supreme Court did in January 2025 in <a href=\"https:\/\/api.sci.gov.in\/supremecourt\/2019\/13316\/13316_2019_1_1501_58853_Judgement_28-Jan-2025.pdf\">Chandrabhan Sudam Sanap v State of Maharashtra<\/a>, suggesting Section 63&#8217;s stricter certificate will be no less rigorous. For IoT evidence, this bites hard: recordings from a smart speaker or wearable rarely sit on a device the user controls, but on servers run by Amazon, Google or Apple. The person relying on such a recording is neither the system&#8217;s operator nor able to furnish either half of the certificate, so admissibility depends on a foreign corporation&#8217;s willingness to cooperate with an Indian court.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h1 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>The Privacy Counterpoint<\/strong><\/h1>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">One important issue with certification is that of its constitutional relevance. The judgment delivered in <a href=\"https:\/\/api.sci.gov.in\/supremecourt\/2012\/35071\/35071_2012_Judgement_26-Sep-2018.pdf\">Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India<\/a> of India stated that privacy is part of the right to live and enjoy personal liberty. The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 aims to implement this legal basis through very strict compliance in terms of the use of privacy-informing consent. We can observe that the problem of certification is mostly not technical but a problem of how the system is designed. For example, a smart speaker works only when it keeps listening constantly to the ambient sounds around it. However, smart speakers cannot recognise the voices of their registered users, those of their family members or even a child, whereas none of these people has any contractual relationship with the company whose speaker it is. When we add to this the rule that under the Act there are stricter provisions <a href=\"https:\/\/ssrana.in\/articles\/meity-notifies-final-digital-personal-data-protection-rules-2025\/\">for underage individuals requiring them to obtain parental consent for information processing<\/a>, we see the contradiction which arises from the use of smart household devices in places where everybody can use them. The shift of a recording made for assorted purposes, such as listening to music or receiving a reminder, into an examination or commercial setting is explained in privacy literature as a violation of <a href=\"https:\/\/crypto.stanford.edu\/portia\/papers\/privacy_in_context.pdf\">\u201ccontextual integrity\u201d<\/a> since the information can be distorted in ways that deviate from social norms that governed initial data sharing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h1 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Self-Incrimination and the Right to Privacy<\/strong><\/h1>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The constitutionality of the use of such recordings in legal proceedings cannot be described entirely negatively. The right against self-incrimination provided in Article 20(3) does not bar the use of voice recordings for evidentiary purposes; in a case, <a href=\"https:\/\/gnlu.ac.in\/Content\/the-gnlu-law-review\/pdf\/volume-8-issue-2\/09_aditi___ashray%20.pdf\">Ritesh Sinha v State of Uttar Pradesh<\/a>, voice samples were identified as non-testimonial evidence comparable to fingerprints and handwriting samples. Moreover, according to <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mha.gov.in\/sites\/default\/files\/2024-04\/250884_2_english_01042024.pdf\">Section 349 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023<\/a>, magistrates are entitled to collect voice samples during the police investigation; therefore, a recording made with the help of smart speakers can hardly invoke protections granted to the accused by Article 20(3) of the Constitution to the individual whose voice was recorded. This was substantiated by the Supreme Court&#8217;s older ruling in <a href=\"https:\/\/jajharkhand.in\/wp\/wp-content\/judicial_updates_files\/13_Evidence_Act\/27_tape_recorded_conversation\/R._M._Malkani_vs_State_Of_Maharashtra_on_22_September,_1972.PDF\">R.M. Malkani v State of Maharashtra<\/a> that a voluntarily recorded conversation does not offend self-incrimination merely because the speaker was unaware of the recording. Article 21, however, is a separate and broader guarantee available to any individual whose voice or biometric signature is recorded. Indian courts have shown that they have been willing to take a cautious approach in regard to the admissibility of recordings that have been obtained without the consent of the recorded party, while still allowing the record to be used.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h1 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Reliability, Custody and the Cross-Border Problem<\/strong><\/h1>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">While a recording may meet the standard for admissibility, its value as evidence is hardly guaranteed. Wearable devices may malfunction, wake words become activated by mistake, clocks may fall out of sync with one another, and cloud-stored recordings may undergo automated processing before reaching a human. As a result, ensuring the chain of custody of the inherent recording becomes crucial before the evidence can even be trusted in court. Custodians of this data are likely to be multinational companies, which makes responding to calls from the Indian courts very unlikely to happen quickly. Furthermore, the servers providing that data may be based completely outside the Indian borders. Consequently, investigators are left with the option of negotiating access to the only account available to them for a certain series of events instead of issuing any commands. Moreover, existing mutual legal assistance procedures are incapable of responding to such a need promptly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h1 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/h1>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">India, in other words, already has most of the scaffolding needed to treat IoT data as evidence. Puttaswamy supplies the privacy rationale, Section 63 supplies the admissibility route, and Ritesh Sinha clarifies the self-incrimination boundary. What is missing is the procedural machinery to turn that scaffolding into timely, reliable practice. Three safeguards would help. Firstly, a time-bound cooperation mechanism with major platforms, replacing slow mutual legal assistance channels, so investigators can obtain cloud-stored recordings within a trial&#8217;s actual timelines. Secondly, an expanded network of <a href=\"https:\/\/www.meity.gov.in\/static\/uploads\/2025\/11\/67f1ee29ffea0e76a3e5b5fee9883711.pdf\">Examiners of Electronic Evidence notified under Section 79A of the Information Technology Act, 2000<\/a>, equipped for cloud and IoT forensics, so domestic experts, not an uncooperative foreign custodian, can complete the Section 63 certificate. Thirdly, the law should be updated so that guests or domestic workers must be notified if a shared smart device recorded them and the police take that data. Additionally, courts should treat smart device data with the same strict rules they use for CCTV video and phone records. This means proving the evidence is real by checking its digital fingerprint and ensuring the timestamps are accurate, which the new Section 63 requires. As Indian homes fill with listening speakers and Indian wrists carry sensing bands, the eyewitness of the future will increasingly be made of silicon rather than flesh. Getting that witness into the courtroom is no longer the difficulty; what remains is making sure it can be properly cross-examined.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Sangjam Chakraborty and Kanishk Garg are Second Year Students at National Law University Odisha &amp; Hidayatullah National Law University Introduction In October [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1471","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-blog-series","col-md-6 col-sm-6"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/clt.nliu.ac.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1471","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/clt.nliu.ac.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/clt.nliu.ac.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/clt.nliu.ac.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/clt.nliu.ac.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=1471"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/clt.nliu.ac.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1471\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1473,"href":"https:\/\/clt.nliu.ac.in\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1471\/revisions\/1473"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/clt.nliu.ac.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=1471"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/clt.nliu.ac.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=1471"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/clt.nliu.ac.in\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=1471"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}